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POINTS OF VIEW FROM A LOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (I)  
M a r i e  D U Ž Í  - B j 0 r n  J E S P E R S E N  - Pave l  M A T E R N A  
In the  p a p e r  w e  o f f e r  a logical explication of the  f requently  u s e d ,  b u t  rather  
v a g u e ,  notion of point of view W e  s h o w  that  the  concept of point  of v i e w  
p r e v e n t s  certain p a r a d o x e s  f r o m  arising.  A point  of v i e w  is  a m e a n s  of partial 
characterisation of s o m e t h i n g  T h u s  n o t h i n g  is  a P a n d  a t  the  s a m e  t ime a non-
P (simpliciter), b e c a u s e  it i s  a P only  re lat ive  to s o m e  point of v i e w  a n d  a non-P 
f r o m  another point  of v i e w .  But  there  i s  a major ,  complicating factor i n v o l v e d  
i n  a p p l y i n g  a logical m e t h o d  that  is  s u p p o s e d  to p r o v i d e  a f o r m a l  a n d  r i g o r o u s  
counterpart  of the  intuit ively  u n d e r s t o o d  notion- 'point of v i e w '  i s  a h o m o n y ­
m o u s  express ion ,  a n d  s o  t h e r e  is n o t  jus t  o n e  m e a n i n g  t h a t  w o u l d  e x p l a i n  
p o i n t s  of v i e w  Yet w e  p r o p o s e  a c o m m o n  s c h e m e  of t h e  logical  t y p e  of t h e  
ent i t ies  d e n o t e d  b y  t h e  t e r m  ' p o i n t  of v i e w ' .  It i s  a n  empi r i ca l  function, w h e n  
a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  v i e w e d  object  i n  ques t i on ,  it resul t s  i n  a (set  o f )  e v a l u a t i n g  
propos i t ion(s )  a b o u t  t h e  object .  If t h e r e  is a n  a g e n t  a p p l y i n g  t h e  cr i te r ion ,  t h e  
r e su l t  i s  t h e  a g e n t ' s  attitude t o  t h e  respec t ive  object.  T h e  p a p e r  i s  o r g a n i s e d  i n t o  
t w o  p a r t s .  I n  P a r t  I w e  f i rs t  a d d u c e  a n d  a n a l y s e  v a r i o u s  e x a m p l e s  of  typ ica l  
cases  of a p p l y i n g  a p o i n t  of v i e w  t o  p r e v e n t  p a r a d o x .  T h e s e  cases  a r e  e x a m i n e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  t y p e  of t h e  v i e w e d  objec t '  a) t h e  v i e w e d  object  i s  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  
a n d  b )  t h e  v i e w e d  object  i s  a p r o p e r t y  o r  a n  office.  I n  P a r t  II w e  t h e n  s h o w  t h a t  
t h e  m e t h o d  desc r ibed  i n  P a r t  I c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  a l so  t o  t h e  a n a l y s e s  of a g e n t s '  
a t t i t udes .  W e  t h u s  exp la in  h o w  a n  a g e n t  c a n  be l ieve  of s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  i t  i s  a P 
a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a n o n - P  t h e  a g e n t  a p p l i e s  d i f f e r en t  v i e w p o i n t  cr i ter ia  t o  
t h e  v i e w e d  object.  T h e  i n v e r s i o n  of pe r spec t ive  cons is t ing  i n  t h e  pe r spec t i ve  
s h i f t i n g  f r o m  t h e  be l i eve r  o n  t o  t h e  r e p o r t e r  m t h e  case  of a t t i t u d e s  de re, a n d  
f r o m  t h e  r e p o r t e r  t o  t h e  be l i eve r  m t h e  case  of a t t i t u d e s  de dieto, i s  a l so  
a n a l y z e d .  W e  s h o w  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  s m o o t h  logical t ra f f ic  b a c k  a n d  f o r t h  
b e t w e e n  s u c h  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  p r o v e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  equ iva len t .  B y  w a y  of  
conc lus ion ,  w e  expl ica te  t h e  n o t i o n  of conceptual p o i n t  of v i e w  a n d  a n a l y z e  
cases  of v i e w p o i n t s  g i v e n  b y  c o n c e p t u a l  d is t inc t ion  W e  s h o w ,  f inal ly ,  t h a t  t h e  
p r o p o s e d  s c h e m e  of t h e  t y p e  of p o i n t  of v i e w  c a n  b e  p r e s e r v e d ,  t h i s  t ime ,  
h o w e v e r ,  m i t s  ex tens iona l  ve r s ion .  
1 .  Problem a n d  methodological  prel iminaries 
This p a p e r  offers  a logical explication1 of the not ion of point  of view. The 
m e t h o d  of such a n  explication is to  replace a contentual b u t  vague  no­
tion b y  a formal  b u t  r igorous s imulacrum a n d  then distil var ious  charac­
1
 I t  w a s  C a r n a p  w h o  h a s  i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  t e r m  'expl ica t ion '  See  C a r n a p  (1962) 
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teristics of this formal notion. The idea behind  this method  of indirect il­
lumination of a notion is that  since the original notion is no t  logically 
tractable, a t  least its formal  counterpart  will be.  The philosophical task 
accompanying the logical work  therefore consists i n  maintaining a n d  ar­
guing  for  the intuitive link between the contentual a n d  the formal no­
tion, a n d  will b e  successful if the link is established. If the link is torn  
asunder ,  the findings relating t o  the  formal not ion will h a v e  n o  bearing 
o n  the informal not ion a n d  the  explication will have  failed. Obviously, 
there can b e  n o  such  thing as a proof of the adequacy of the explication, 
since the link can b e  nothing other than intuitive. However ,  w h a t  speaks 
i n  favour of a given explication is whether  it can  give a principled a n d  
unified account of the host  of phenomena  that  the informal notion gives 
rise to. 
O u r  problem then is to  characterize a t  least some facets of the notion 
of point  of view a n d  to d o  s o  through the pr i sm of logic. It is important  
to stress that the enterprise is not  the m u c h  more  ambitious one  of pro­
viding a n  "actual logic" of points  of view. This w o u l d  require, inter alia, 
a set of axioms a n d  inference rules together w i th  a regimented vocabu­
lary. Such a n  under taking is far beyond  the scope of this paper ,  which 
instead intends t o  indicate the general direction that a logical inquiry 
into points  of view should  h e a d  in to  while committ ing itself to  a logical 
analysis of various key  notions b y  providing formalizations. 
O u r  problem-solving approach is the one characteristic of contempo­
rary  analytic philosophy. Rather than at tempting a direct analysis of 
a notion w e  provide  a semantic analysis of expressions within which 
terms denoting o r  expressing the notion occur. I.e., w e  d o  no t  directly 
ask w h a t  points of v iew are b u t  wha t  the expression 'point  of v iew '  de ­
notes a n d  means. The link be tween  the meaning of 'point  of v iew'  a n d  
the intuitive not ion of point  of view is established b y  the fact that  w e  
make  the linguistic meaning  pa r t  of the explication of the intuitive no­
tion. 
But there is a major  complicating factor involved. Points of view ob­
viously cannot b e  b rough t  u n d e r  just one  hat .  In linguistic terms, 'point  
of v iew '  is a homonymous  expression, a n d  s o  there is no t  just one  lin­
guistic meaning that w o u l d  explain points of view. Further, w e  n e e d  t o  
introduce a no t  inconsiderable measure  of flexibility as  for  the objects 
that  m a y  serve a s  points  of view. Some cases call for fairly c rude  indi­
viduation, as w h e n  a point  of v iew is simply a criterion which  divides 
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a domain into those elements that are in and the rest which are out. 
Other cases demand a very  fine-grained separation of points of view, as  
when a point of v i e w  results in an attitude. 
The semantic analyses will b e  cast in terms of one particular theory 
called Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). Our principal reason for 
choosing TIL is  that of the current theories in formal semantics it argua­
b ly  provides  one  of the most  worked-out  a n d  rigorous conceptions of 
various linguistic meanings. The architecture of TIL consists of exten-
sional objects o n  the ground-floor,  intensional objects o n  the first floor a n d  
so-called constructions (hyper-intensional objects) o n  the second floor a n d  
u p .  Extensional a n d  intensional objects (not involving constructions) to­
gether f o r m  the type of first-order objects, while constructions (and ob­
jects involving constructions) are higher-order objects. The intensional 
objects a r e  those of possible-worlds semantics, i.e., mappings  def ined o n  
a logical space of possible worlds.  In  keeping wi th  more  recent t rends  i n  
possible-worlds semantics, instants of t ime are included. A n  intension 
then becomes a mapp ing  f rom wor lds  on to  chronologies (strings of 
times) of objects. The resulting objects m a y  b e  extensional ones like sets, 
individuals  o r  truth-values, b u t  also other  intensions. For instance, the  
intension  the Pope's noblest property takes properties, n o t  sets as  its values. 
Intensions w h o s e  ranges are themselves intensions are still first-order 
objects b u t  of a higher degree than those intensions whose  ranges a re  ex­
tensions. 
The  key  constructions a re  four  i n  number 2 ,  t w o  of which qual ify as  
structured hyperintensions. Hyperintensions,  because their principle of in­
dividuat ion is f iner than necessary equivalence. Structured, because they 
literally contain (invariably abstract) constituents arranged i n  particular 
ways,  which  altogether specify a n  intellectual itinerary whose  destina­
tion is some  particular object. A leading idea in forming TIL is that  func­
tion, unl ike relation o r  set, is  the fundamenta l  primitive notion in  a n y  
explication. Functions are the  'movers '  of logic; though  they d o  no t  actu­
ally m o v e  objects a round,  of course, they take one particular object, o r  
pool  of objects, to  another particular object b y  mapp ing  a pre-image t o  
its image. Functions allow y o u  to  depict  h o w  different objects hook  u p  
2
 Pavel Tichý w h o  founded the TIL system actually introduced six constructions. Besides 
the four  types  that w e  are going to use, namely a variable, trivialisation, application and 
a lambda abstraction he also defined execution and double-execution. For details see Ti­
chý (1988). 
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wi th  each other (as arguments  a n d  values). So d o  relations, b u t  the logic 
of relations has  n o  r o o m  for the notions of the procedure of setting u p  
a relation f rom such-and-such to  such-and-such a n d  the procedure  of 
moving  f r o m  a relation to one  of its terms. So thanks no t  least to func­
tional abstraction a n d  application, the logic of functions (i.e., the lambda-
calculus) is more  powerful .  Besides it is able to account for  relations a n d  
sets as  functions. A set is a characteristic function (akin to  a Begriff i n  
Frege), a n d  a relation is a function f rom a n  «-tuple to  a truth-value. 
The vertical architecture of TIL offers a w i d e  array of points  of view. 
Both intensions a n d  constructions can b e  m a d e  to  serve i n  the roles of 
points  of view. For instance, w e  m a y  say that: 
(a) As  a musician Charles is a n  amateur,  b u t  as  a rocket scientist h e  is 
a t rue professional. 
(b) From the viewpoint  of their ability to amuse  people,  Charles a n d  
Paul  are similar, b u t  otherwise they are quite dissimilar. 
(c) F rom the point  of v iew of logical behaviour,  m a n  is a rational be­
ing, b u t  f rom the point  of view of social behaviour  m a n  is a wild 
beast. 
(d) The wolf is useful  f rom the viewpoint  of natural  balance, b u t  f rom 
hare ' s  point  of view h e  is destructive. 
(e) Under  the aspect of be ing  a Quaker,  Richard Nixon  is a pacifist; 
unde r  the  aspect of be ing  a Republican h e  is militant. 
( f )  Wha t  is Charles 's viewpoint  of the  problem of nuclear power  us­
age? H e  believes that  it  is  indispensable, b u t  h e  doubts  whether  it 
is  safe. 
W e  can  see that  points  of v iew provide  some  partial characteristics of 
the  v iewed object; (e) is a n  example of t w o  incompatible perspectives o n  
the  same  sort of state-of-affairs. Under  the  aspect of Quaker, Richard 
Nixon  is a pacifist; u n d e r  the aspect of Republican, Nixon is militant. This 
is a s tandard  example f r o m  the  literature o n  non-monotonic reasoning, 
which  deals w i th  defeasible inferences. Here  the example serves a s  one  
of mutual ly  exclusive properties (pacifist, militant) be ing  appl ied to the 
s ame  individual simultaneously,  (a) makes  Charles b o t h  a n  amateur  a n d  
a professional, b u t  no t  wi th  respect to  the same proper ty  (instead: musi­
cian, scientist). (b) br ings  Charles a n d  Paul  o n  a n  equal  footing b y  having  
them share  the same proper ty  (the ability to amuse  people), b u t  makes  
t h e m  otherwise dissimilar. 
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W e  will show that the concept of point of v i e w  prevents certain para­
doxes f rom arising. E.g., wi thout  the option of falling back o n  points of 
view, either the  question whether  Charles is a n  amateur  o r  a professional 
could not  b e  asked, since nobody is a n  amateur  or  a professional  simplic-
iter bu t  only relative to  some point  of view, or  else Charles is bo th  a n  
amateur  a n d  a professional (simpliciter). Hence w e  avoid  the following 
sort of arguments:  
Charles is a n  amateur  f r o m  the point  of view of music, s o  Charles is 
a n  amateur.  Charles is a professional f r o m  the point  of view of science, 
s o  Charles is a professional. Therefore, Charles is a n  amateur  a n d  
Charles is a professional. 
O u r  point  of depar ture  is that w h a t  everything which  qualifies a s  
a point  of v iew a t  all h a s  i n  common is the following. A point  of view is 
a v iew of something f r o m  a particular vantage-point, a n d  the vantage-
point  is a means  of characterisation. A n  agent  w h o  avails himself of the 
characterisation makes  it  h is  perspective. W e  wish  to  stress that  views 
need  no t  b e  perceptual.  In  fact, w e  shall h a v e  nothing i n  particular to  say 
about  perception o r  vision3. A n d  the object which  is a t  the receiving e n d  
of the point  of v i ew n e e d  n o t  b e  concrete. It m a y  b e  a n  individual like 
Lulu, Lulu's  carnivorous pet ,  Lulu 's  house,  Lulu a n d  Lola, b u t  also a n  
abstract object of a n y  kind,  like the proper ty  of be ing  a spider, the indi­
vidual  concept of the Pope,  a mathematical proposition, a chemical o r  
political problem, etc. 
A few examples us ing  questions a n d  answers  m a y  help  fix ideas. 
W h e n  asking, 
What  is Lulu 's  mos t  characteristic property? 
w e  expect the answer  to  cite a particular property,  as  i n  "Lulu is t w o  me­
tres tall." Another  quest ion is more  interesting to  ask, 
What  is Lulu ' s  m o s t  characteristic proper ty  f r o m  the  point  of view of 
he r  social relations wi th  other people  (or he r  hobbies or  h e r  political 
convictions)? 
As  w e  continue t o  ask a n d  answer  questions about  Lulu 's  properties, in­
cluding relational ones, w e  a re  thereby applying criteria that, a s  it  were,  
send  Lulu in to  var ious  sets a n d  keeps  he r  o u t  of other.  As  w e  g o  along 
w e  bui ld  u p  a partial  picture of Lulu. W e  can  also compare  a n  individual 
to  another individual  b y  asking, 
3
 See Does, Lambalgen (2000) 
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Is Lulu similar to Lola? 
Again, several answers are possible. E.g., yes, they are similar from the 
viewpoint of their age and the colour of their hair, but  otherwise com­
pletely dissimilar in  terms of social background.  
The underlying schematic question is, 
What  is the most  characteristic property  of X f rom the viewpoint of A? 
If X is not  Lulu n o w  b u t  the proper ty  of be ing  a spider, then A might  be,  
for  instance, the maximal size, the typical activity, the favourite habitat,  
the number  of limbs, etc, of those individuals  w h o  are spiders. By speci­
fying the values of these criteria for  spiders  w e  get the characteristic 
propert ies of spiders, or  even the necessary conditions (requisites) fo r  be­
ing a spider.  If all those criteria are evaluated for the proper ty  of be ing  
a spider  w e  get  the  essence of the proper ty  of be ing  a spider (the neces­
sary a n d  sufficient condition for be ing  a spider). Formulating the essence 
of a n  intension is equivalent to  ontologically defining the intension. 
N o w  w e  can try to  generalize particular cases of us ing notions like 
criterion, viewpoint, with respect to, as  ment ioned above: 
There is a lways some  object in  the broadest  sense of the word ,  b e  it a n  
individual,  a tuple of individuals, b u t  also a property  (or, in  general,  
some intension), o r  even  a problem, theory, etc., a n d  a point of view (or: 
a viewpoint) f r o m  which  the  object is viewed;  any  of the possible charac­
teristics of the object is (or is not) relevant  with respect to such a view­
point.  W e  can  observe a common feature of the  entities denoted b y  the 
te rm 'point  of view': It is  the  functional character of such a n  entity (crite­
rion). Being appl ied to  the v iewed object, it results in  a (set of) evaluating 
proposition(s) about  the object. If there is a n  agent  applying the criterion, 
the result  is the agent 's  attitude to  the  respective object. 
Hautamäki  in  h i s  (1986) presents a thorough analysis of the not ion 
point  of v i ew us ing  the appara tus  of m o d e r n  logic; informally, h e  ex­
ploits the term  determinable a n d  shows  that  determinables "represent ob­
jective aspects of real entities" (p.23). H e  also states that  determinables 
can  b e  hand led  a s  Chen ' s  attributes, i.e., as  functions that m a p  a n  enti ty 
set into a value set. In our  opinion a m o r e  precise conception of attrib­
utes  h a s  been  worked  o u t  in  the "HIT conceptual mode l"  (see D u ž í  
(2001) where attributes are empirical functions, i.e., functions whose  do­
m a i n  is the  logical space (possible worlds)  a n d  whose  range is a chronol­
ogy of some  values). Wha t  is important ,  however ,  is that  determinables 
(attributes) are  a sort of functions. Verbally they a re  expressed a s  the X of 
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Thus w e  have  the age of, the colour of, even  the colour of the hair of, etc. Hau-
tamäki defines (1986, p.65) points of v iew as  follows: 
A point of view is a finite (proper) subset of I, where I is a set of determinable 
indices (i.e., of particular 'aspects', particular attributes). 
Thus while the members of I are particular (empirical) functions, the 
points of v i e w  are particular selections of such functions (members of 21). 
Hautamäki's work  is  a good example of applying logic to the analysis 
of a frequently used and particularly useful  notion. The contemporary 
tools of logic and mathematics (in particular, theory of lattices) are ex­
ploited a n d  interesting results  obtained. The purpose  of the present  p a ­
p e r  is a similar one; TIL, however ,  differs f rom Hautamäki ' s  approach b y  
(at the least) its explicit intensionalisation (attributes are empirical func­
tions). 
2. Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) 
H e r e  w e  first offer a n  informal  sketch of the philosophy of TIL a n d  of its 
approach to  the analysis of (natural) language a n d  then introduce defini­
tions of key  notions. Some of the central semantic principles of TIL are 
the following. 
Transparency. Every expression, wi thout  exception, is referentially 
t ransparent  i n  the sense tha t  its semantic properties a re  insensitive t o  the  
sort  of linguistic context which  the  expression occurs in. In TIL, seman­
tics is ful ly  a priori a n d  completely anti-contextualist. Wha t  a n  expression 
m e a n s  a n d  w h a t  it denotes  can  b e  ascertained prior to  the deployment  of 
the  expression i n  a context. 
Compositionality. Meaning  of a complex expression is a function of the 
meanings  of the involved subexpressions (together w i th  the logical 
structures of the complex expression a n d  its subexpressions). 
Principle of subject-matter. A n  expression is about  all a n d  only those 
objects which receive ment ion  b y  subexpressions occurring in  the  overall 
expression4. 
Linguistic sense is procedural. The sense of a n y  expression, whether  
atomic o r  molecular, is  a procedure,  of one  or several steps, for  intellec­
tually arriving a t  the object, which  is the denotation of the expression. 
4
 A fo remnner  of t he  principle m a y  b e  found  in Frege (1884): "Ueberhaupt  ist es  unmög­
lich, v o n  e inem Gegenstande z u  sprechen, o h n e  ihn  i rgendwie z u  bezeichnen o d e r  z u  
benennen" .  See also Carnap  (1947), §24.2, §26 and Materna, Duží (2005). 
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All four principles turn on the same conception of language. A piece 
of language serves to point to a logical structure beyond itself, its sense, 
and that's it. Which object, if any, an empirical expression determines in 
the actual world at the present moment is a matter of contingent fact and 
cannot b e  'calculated' a priori. E.g., a language-user will  b e  able to de­
termine the  condition for  being the King of France, b u t  h i s  linguistic 
competence won ' t  suffice for fixing the individual,  if any,  w h o  is actually 
a n d  presently the  King of France. Similarly, a language-user will b e  able 
to  calculate the empirical t ru th  -condition of a sentence b u t  never  its actual 
a n d  present  truth-value. The contrast is be tween conditions a n d  satisfi­
e s ,  concepts a n d  their instances. 
There is c o m m o n  agreement that  reasonable (empirical) sentences 
denote propositions (not just truth-values), b u t  it  is  m u c h  disputed w h a t  
a proposition is. Frege's problem wi th  the difference in  cognitive value 
between "a  = a "  a n d  "a  = b "  (where ' a '  a n d  ' b '  a re  names)  is still puz ­
zling for some logicians, while  leading others t o  a conception of Russel-
lian structured proposit ions (see Russell (1956)), a n d  still others to  hy-
perintensional objects a n d  structured meanings  (see Cresswell (1985)). It 
is also commonly agreed that  empirical definite descriptions are not  
rigid designators i n  Kripke's sense, b u t  that  (names and)  definite de­
scriptions contribute only their denotation to the proposition denoted.  
Still, there is a lot of d i spute  w h a t  the denotation actually is. O u r  system 
is based  o n  the possible-worlds semantics conception, a n d  particular de­
notations of (empirical) expressions are o n  our  conception  intensions— 
functions from possible worlds  (со) and time-points (т). Thus a proposition 
is a function from possible worlds to a chronology of truth-values (o): 
CÜ —> (т —> O). The (individual) description '(иг)Ф' denotes an individual of­
fice— a function f rom possible worlds  to a chronology of individuals: (ú 
—> (т —> i), etc. When  d(t) is the denotation of a term t, an atomic sentence 
of the form 'Rab' denotes a proposition the extension of which takes the 
truth-value T at  a wor ld  w and time t iff the extensions of d(a) and d(b) 
at zv, t are members of a relation, viz. the extension of d(R) at that w, t. 
This is in a good accordance with a general characterisation of a sen­
tence: it denotes some  truth-condition that is o r  is no t  fulfilled in  a state-
of-affairs. For example,  the two  singular proposit ions denoted b y  'Rab'  
a n d  'Ra(ix)0'  will b e  identical only if ' b '  a n d  '(иг)Ф' denote the same ob­
ject—intension. This conception, however, does not solve Frege's prob­
lem of Ъ = (и-)Ф' being informative unlike Ъ = b'. Such intensions are 
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set-theoretical objects (mappings), they are  not structured complexes, 
though they consist of elements. According to Zalta (1989), Russellian 
propositions play the desired role of complexes that result b y  'plugging'  
objects into the 'gaps '  of properties and relations. In our opinion, how ­
ever, properties, relations, or  functions i n  general, h a v e  n o  gaps; particu­
lar objects s imply are members  of (the arguments  of) these unstructured 
mappings5 .  But w e  can accept the possible-world semantics of proposi­
tions, while  the d e m a n d  for  structured meanings is  m e t  b y  another  entity: 
Between a n  expression a n d  the denoted 'f lat '  object there is a structured 
mode of presentation (construction i n  o u r  terminology) of the object, i.e., 
a meaning  (perhaps the Fregean sense) of the  expression. It is  a complex, 
a (declaration of a) procedure that consists in  the  creation of a function b y  
abstracting over objects a n d / o r  in  applying the function to  its arguments .  
But particular (physical/abstract) objects cannot  b e  'p lugged '  into such 
a (conceptual) procedure;  they m u s t  always b e  presented in  a n  (albeit 
primitive) way ,  i.e., their concepts a re  constituents of the procedure.  
There a re  t w o  such primitive modes  of presentations that  insert the ob­
jects in to  t he  construction: variables a n d  trivialisations. The other  t w o  
k inds  of constructions working over these ones are more  complex; they 
are  closure (creating a function b y  abstraction) a n d  composition (applying 
a function to  a n  argument).  T h e  whole  TIL conception can b e  illustrated b y  a n  adjusted Frege-
Church  schema: 
expresses identifies 
expression > sense > denotation 
I ^ 
denotes 
The  sense of a n  empirical expression EE is a construction С of an in­
tension Int, a n d  the  denotation of EE is Int. The  reference of EE a t  some 
WT-index is the extension, if any,  of Int  a t  WT. 
The  sense of a non-empirical (i.e., logical o r  mathematical) expression 
NEE is a construction С either of an extensional object or else of another 
5
 True, Russell's propositions are the sort of things you can plug objects in and out of; tho­
s e  proposi t ions are  structured entities, n o  mappings ,  b u t  then the  notion of m a p p i n g  is 
missing. 
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construction С*. The denotation of NEE is the object, if any, which is con­
structed b y  C.6 
Hence linguistic senses a re  constructions. The sense of a sentence is 
a construction of a proposit ion denoted b y  the sentence. Sub-sentential 
expressions, like definite descriptions o r  predicates, h a v e  senses, too. 
There are n o  syncategorematic terms in  TIL. The relation be tween  the 
first-order object (intension) a n d  that  w h a t  is, in  most  semantic theories, 
considered to b e  the reference of a n  expression (for instance, a n  indivi­
d u a l  in  space and  time, a set of individuals,  etc.) does  no t  h a v e  a seman­
tic character; it  is  influenced b y  a n  empirical factor (a state of affairs), 
a n d  thus  it  is no t  directly the subject of a semantic investigation. Hence  
the  co-reference of expressions is f rom the TIL point  of v iew a contin­
gent,  empirical matter. Expressions can  b e  equivalent w h e n  they denote  
one  a n d  the same object, b u t  d o  no t  have  (even in this case) to  have  the 
same  sense, i.e., d o  n o t  h a v e  to b e  synonymous.  
Empirical expressions are never  empty,  for they always denote  a n  in­
tension. But a n  empirical expression m a y  fail to  take a reference a t  
a world-time pair. Non-empirical expressions a re  empty  in  rare  cases, for  
no t  every construction is p roper  i n  the sense of constructing a n  object. 
A classical example: The construction of the largest p r ime  is improper ,  
a n d  therefore the mathematical  expression ' the  largest p r ime '  h a s  n o  de­
notation. It is vital to  unders tand  that  the realm of reference is beyond  
the  realm of semantics. It is  irrelevant to  the semantic propert ies of a n  
empirical definite description, say, whether  it is  Dick, Tom, Har ry  o r  no-
one  w h o  is the King of Canada.  This is also w h y  the issue of co-reference 
of empirical expressions is a n  extra-semantic one.7 
PSW propositions are i n  fact noth ing b u t  truth-values-in-intension, 
noth ing b u t  truth-values distr ibuted across wor lds  a n d  times. Apar t  
f r o m  simply identifying proposit ions wi th  truth-values, a s  i n  classical 
prepositional logic, the PWS conception of proposition is the shallowest 
possible. Such proposit ions merely depict the modal  profile of a n  em­
pirical sentence. This fairly c rude  differentiation of sentences is required, 
for  w e  w a n t  to  b e  able to say that  ' a  is heavier than b '  denotes  one  a n d  
the same proposition, o r  state-of-affairs, as  Ъ is lighter than a'. Why? Be­
cause reality looks the same. O n e  overstretches the capacity of PWS 
h
 Only  m a degenerate sense does  NEE have  a reference, since its reference, if any  a t  all, is 
the  s ame  for all worlds  a n d  t imes 
7
 Jespersen (2006) 
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propositions b y  turning them into sentential meanings, though. For 
surely 'a is heavier than b '  should not mean the same as Ъ is lighter than 
a'. But then we  must part company with truth-conditional semantics. 
Sentential senses are not truth-conditions. Instead sentential senses are 
procedures whose products are truth-conditions. 
The TIL 'language of constructions' is transparent as well. In contrast 
to standard formal theories, which start out with a naked syntax and 
only subsequently proceed to a semantic interpretation in a model, in 
TIL the notion of a naked formal expression as a pure graphic shape can 
be arrived at only through abstracting its sense away from it. In terms of 
conceptual priority, TIL starts out with sense-endowed expressions, 
which is to say that the 'symbolic language' of TIL-constructions consti­
tutes a n  ' interpreted formalism'. Every factor that is semantically salient 
is explicitly present  i n  the respective formalism. This is evident, for  in­
stance, i n  the explicit typing of the theory, the types of TIL being exclu­
sively objectual. So wha t  qualifies the ' formal language'  of TIL as  inher­
ently interpreted is that a naked shape can  b e  introduced as a n  expres­
sion only if it is  paired off wi th  a construction constructing a n  object of 
a particular type. 
Definit ion 1 (Simple types over a base): 
An objectual base is a collection of mutual ly  disjoint nonempty sets. 
i) Every member  of the base  is a type over the base 
ii) Let a ,  ßi,..., ß„, b e  types over the base. Then ( a  ßi... ß,„), i.e., the set of 
. all OT-ary total a n d  partial) functions wi th  a n  argument  (i.e., a tu­
ple) (bi,...,b,„), where  b, (1 < i < m) is  a member  of the type ß,, a n d  
a t  mos t  one  value of type  a, is a type over the base. 
iii) Noth ing  is a type over the base unless it  so  follows f rom i) - ii). 
A n  object О (that is a member) of a type a will be denoted an a-object, 
O/a. 
An  epistemic base consists of sets of objects of four basic categories: 
v, o, w, t, where i is a type (set) of individuals, о is the type (set) of truth-
values {T, F}, со is the type (set) of possible worlds, and т is the type (set) of 
time moments, or real numbers (playing the role of their surrogates). 
TIL is an open-ended system. The above epistemic base {o, i, т, со} 
was chosen, because it is apt for natural-language analysis, but in the ca­
se of mathematics a (partially) distinct base  w o u l d  b e  appropriate; for in-
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Stance, the base consisting of natural numbers, of type v, and truth-
values. Derived types would  then b e  defined over {v, o}. 
TIL language of constructions can b e  viewed a s  a typed /.-calculus 
whose terms denote not the functions constructed but  the constructions 
themselves. They are, as  it were, transparent windows  to constructions, 
and it i s  superfluous to mention the terms, since the symbolic language 
of the X-calculus allows u s  to talk about the constructions. Observe that 
the Frege-Church schema does not apply to lambda-terms. These terms 
denote directly without the mediation of another construction. Did the 
lambda-terms not directly denote, their denotational schema would  have  
to account for how the construction which some lambda-term expresses 
constructs the construction that is the expression's denotation. Thus, e.g., 
instead of claiming that 'Ax [°> x °0]' denotes the construction Ax [°> .r °0] 
which constructs the class of positive numbers,  w e  simply say Xx [°> x °0] 
is the construction that constructs the class of positive numbers.  
Definit ion 2 (Constructions): 
i) Variables are constructions. Variables a n d  constructions involving 
variables construct objects dependency  o n  a valuation  v, they  v-
construct. 
ii) If X is a n  entity whatsoever,  even  a construction, then °X is a con­
struction called trivialisation. Trivialisation °X constructs X without  
any  change. 
iii) If Xo is a construction that  u-constructs a function F, i.e. a n  
( a  ßi...ß„)-object, a n d  Xi,...,X„ are constructions that  u-construct 
ßi,...,ß„-objects bi,...,b„, respectively, then [Xo Xi ... X„] is a construc­
tion called composition. If F is defined o n  the argument 
<bi,...,b„>, then composition [Xo Xi...X„] ^-constructs the value of F 
o n  (bi,...,b„); otherwise it  does  no t  construct anything; it  is v-
improper. 
iv) Let x\,...,xn b e  pair-wise distinct variables that range over types 
ßi,...,ß„, a n d  let X b e  a construction that ^-constructs a n  a-object 
for some type a .  Then [Axi...x„ X] is a construction called closure 
(abstraction). It u-constructs the following function F of the type ( a  
ßi. .  ,ß„): Let v' b e  a valuation that  differs f rom  v a t  mos t  b y  assign­
ing objects bi,...,b,„ (of the respective types) to variables  x\,...,xn, 
respectively. Then the value  of the function F o n  the argument  
(bi,...,b„) is the object и'-constructed by X. If X is v '-improper, then 
F is undefined on the given argument. 
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v) Nothing is  a construction unless it s o  follows from i) - iv). 
Notes: 
1. The simplest constructions are variables; they are open constructions 
that y-construct objects. They are no letters, no  characters. 
2. Trivialisation is a one-step procedure which consists in grasping an 
object and its "delivering" without any change. If X is an entity, then 
°X is a presentation of X without  a 'perspective' a n d  without  going 
via any  properties of X. The term '°X' might  b e  likened to a constant 
of a formal  language; b u t  unlike such a formal  constant, which can b e  
interpreted in  many  ways  s o  as to  denote different entities a n d  thus  
actually is no t  a constant b u t  a 'variable construction', '°X' rigidly de­
notes construction °X that constantly constructs X. 
A possible objection against such a conception might  be: Well, 
your  transparent  approach m a y  b e  accurate enough,  b u t  you  lose the 
expressive p o w e r  of model  theories enabling u s  to  examine common 
properties a n d  relations holding in  all the particular models. N o t  a t  
all; The TIL transparent approach is more  precise, particular 'models '  
are rendered b y  valuations of (higher-level) variables. 
If °X constructs X without  any change, it  sounds  like trivialization 
is just  a paper-shuffl ing bureaucrat,  b u t  trivialization is b y  n o  means  
a s  innocent o r  idle a s  it  m a y  seem. E.g., w h e n  prefixed to a construc­
tion С, С becomes mentioned rather than used so that С itself can be­
come a subject of predication (for the use /men t ioned  distinction a s  
applied t o  constructions, see Materna (1998), §5.5). A historical fore­
runner  of trivialization w o u l d  b e  Bolzano's singular ideas; see Casari 
(1992), §11.7, and Bolzano (1837), § 101. The basic idea is that to every 
object о corresponds an idea (Vorstellung an sich; construction) which 
exclusively picks out o. Similarly, any object can be presented via a 
trivialization of it. For instance, the trivialization  0 0 0 X  is constructed 
by  0 0 0 0 X .  The assumption of trivialization is a strong one, of course, 
and restraint in its use in an analysis is called for. Ideally, the best 
analysis of an expression should trivialise only logically non-
composite objects, unless a construction is mentioned in a hyper-
intensional context. 
3. Composition corresponds to the traditional operation of functional ap­
plication of a function to  a n  argument.  It should b e  borne  in  mind ,  
however ,  that  a composition is the very procedure of applying a func­
tion to a n  a rgument  a n d  n o t  the product ,  o r  result, of the application. 
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Of course, b y  using a composition [Xo Xi...X„] w e  obtain the product  
of this procedure. If w e  wan t  to  obtain the very procedure itself ('to 
talk about  it'), w e  can use  trivialisation °[Xo Xi...Xn]. Composition is 
the only construction that m a y  b e  (f-)improper, namely in  two  cases: 
First, the component  Xo constructs a function F a n d  components  
Xi,...,X„ construct (bi,...,b„), b u t  F is no t  defined on this argument  (re­
member,  F is a partial function). Second, some o r  more  of the compo­
nents  Xo, Xi,..., X„ fail to construct a n  object (are v-improper). 
In  case some of the components  Xo, Xj,...,X„ d o  not  construct a n  
object of the proper  type so  as  to create a n  argument  for F, the ex­
pression  '[Xo Xi-.-X,,]' is no t  a well-formed term, a n d  it does  no t  de­
note  a construction. 
4. A.-Closure corresponds to  the traditional operation of functional ab­
straction. It enables u s  to construct a function, a n d  thus  also to  analyse 
talking about  the whole function ('mentioning'), n o t  only talking 
about  a particular value o n  a given a rgument  ( 'using' the function). 
Closure can never  b e  u-improper; it  a lways constructs a function, 
even if the constructed function is no t  defined o n  any of its argu­
ments,  like, e.g., [A.X [°Div x °0]]. 
5. Quantifiers—universal V a  a n d  existential 3 a—are n o  expressions b u t  
functional objects of type (o(oa)). W e  will write (Vx)A, (3x)A instead 
of [°Va XxA], [°3a XxA], respectively. The singulariser8 i a  is a n  object 
of type  (a(oa)), a n d  instead of [0ia  Xx A]  w e  will u se  utA (the only 
x such that A). W e  will also use  a s tandard  infix notation wi thout  trivi­
alisation in  case of using truth-value functions (л, v, ...), identities, 
less than, greater than functions (=, <, >, ...), but we  have to keep in 
mind that these are just abbreviations that conceal the self-contained 
meaning of the respective 'logical symbols'. 
Our apparatus is very powerful. It enables us, as we  saw, to distin­
guish between various levels of using a n d  mentioning particular  entities of 
o u r  ontology: 
• Non-functional a n d  non-procedural  objects can only b y  mentioned,  
like °3, "Charles. 
8
 W e  u s e  the  same symbol i for denoting the  type of individuals, as well as  the function 
smgulariser, since n o  confusion may  arise 
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• Functions can  b e  used  for  arriving a t  their value a t  a n  argument,  i.e., 
b y  composing their construction wi th  a n  argument;  e.g., [Xx [°+ x °1] 
°3], which yields the number  4. 
• Functions can  also b e  mentioned; w e  can predicate some  ф of a func­
tion, like, e.g.: [°Bij Xx [°+ x °1]], where  Bij(ection) / (о (тт)) is the class 
of one-to-one mappings. 
• Constructions can  b e  u s e d  for constructing (identifying) a n  entity, for  
instance the  construction  Xx [°+ x °1] ha s  been u s e d  above for  con­
structing the funct ion of add ing  number  one. Constructions them­
selves can  b e  ment ioned a s  well. For instance, "dividing b y  zero  does  
no t  yield a n y  result for  any  number"  — [°Impi °[°: x °0]], where  Impi 
is a class of constructions that fail to »-construct anything for  any  
valuation  v. 
• Constructions a re  mentioned, e.g., in  hyper-intensional contexts of 
knowing, believing, etc., where  the meaning (i.e., the expressed con­
struction) plays  a crucial role. For instance w h e n  "Charles knows  that  
dividing b y  ze ro  does  n o t  yield any  result for  a n y  number"  h e  is re­
lated to  the construction [°Impi °[°: x °0]] a n d  n o t  to  its truth-value 
True. Such contexts w e  refer to  as  'constructional', since the att i tude 
relata are constructions a n d  not  w h a t  they construct. 
" But constructions cannot  b e  typed within the simple theory of types, 
a n d  constructional contexts wou ld  therefore b e  wi thout  a logic. The 
ramified hierarchy of types in TIL serves exactly to  type construc­
tions. The hierarchy is ramified because it includes objects of a n  in­
creasingly h igher  order.  
Definit ion 3 (Ramified theory of types) 
Let В be a base, i.e., a collection of mutually disjoint non-empty sets. 
(Ti) Types of order 1 
Defined according to Definition 1. 
(C„) Constructions of order n 
i) Let a b e  a type of order  n over B. If q is a variable that  ranges 
over  a ,  then  £, is a construction of order n over  B. 
ii) If X is a member  of a type of order  n over B, then °X is a con­
struction of order n over  B. 
iii) If X0, Xi,..., Xm a re  constructions of order n over B, then [X0 
Xi...Xm] i s  a construction of order n over  B. 
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iv) If distinct variables  x\,...,x„„ a s  well  as  X, are  constructions of or­
der n over  В, then [Xx\...x
m
 X] is a construction of order n over B. 
v) Nothing is a construction of order n over В unless it so follows 
from (C„i-iv). 
(T n+ 1) Types of order n+1 
Let *n b e  the  collection of all constructions of o rde r  n over  B. 
Types of o rder  n+1 over В are defined as follow: 
i) *n and all the types of order n are types of order n+1 over B. 
ii) If a, ßi, ..., ß,„ are types  of o rde r  n+1, then  the set ( a  ßi...ßm) of 
all m-ary (total a n d  partial) funct ions f rom ßi x ... x ßm  t o  a i s  
also a type of order n+1 over  B. 
iii) Noth ing  is a type of order n+1 over  В unless it so follows from 
( T „ + i  i )  a n d  (T„+i i i ) .  
Notational conventions: Empirical expressions denote  intensions, w h e r e  a -
intensions are  funct ions of type (aa>); since a-intensions are of ten  of type  
((ат)со), w e  abbreviate this type b y  We use variables w, m ,  as 
ranging over tí), and variables  t, ti, ... a s  ranging over type x. If X is  
a construction that constructs an intension of type а
т ш /
 then instead of 
[[Xw]r] w e  write X
wt
. 
Examples of intensions: 
• Individual roles (offices) (e.g., the pres ident  of USA) a re  objects of type  
• properties of individuals (e.g., be ing  a spider)  a re  objects of type  (oi)tC0; 
• b inary  relations-in-intensions be tween  individuals  (being i n  love, kick­
ing, ...) a re  objects of type  (ои)
тш
; 
• propositions a re  objects of type  oT(0; 
• magnitudes (like t h e  tempera ture  i n  Prague)  are  objects of t y p e  т
т < ! )
. 
To illustrate the principles of TIL analyses of (natural language) ex­
pressions,  w e  n o w  a d d u c e  a n  example  of a n  analysis of the sentence 
(S) The richest man (in the world) is in danger. 
a) First, w e  h a v e  to  pe r fo rm  a type-theoretical analysis of the  objects t h e  
sentence (S) talks about ,  i.e., of t h e  objects denoted  b y  semantically self-
contained sub-expressions of (S) means:  denotes a n  object of a type  
a , ' / '  means:  the object be longs  t o  the  type  a): 
(S) R M D  / oT0) 
richest —> Richest / (i (oi))TM 
m a n  —> M a n  / (oi)Ti0 
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the richest man —> RM / iT0) 
being in danger —> Danger / (oi)T0, 
Comments: The whole sentence denotes, of course, a proposition. The ri­
chest denotes a function Richest that (dependently o n  worlds / types)  se­
lects a n  individual f rom a set of individuals, namely the richest one, Ri­
chest of type (v (oi))ra. Man, being in danger denote properties of indivi­
duals,  the richest man denotes a n  individual office. 
b )  Synthesis. N o w  w e  have  to compose constructions of particular 
subdenotations in order  to obtain a n  adequate analysis of the sentence, 
i.e., a construction of the denoted proposition RMD. When  doing so, w e  
have  to follow the principle of subject matter, in  other words ,  w e  can com­
bine  only constructions of the objects the sentence talks about.  Moreover, 
to obtain  the most  accurate analysis, w e  have  to u se  all the objects the 
sentence talks about  (we m u s t  n o t  'omit anything'). 
The simplest possible analysis might  b e  °RMD, which  is just  the sim­
plest  trivial presentation of the denoted proposition wi thout  any structu­
ral  perspective (the trivialisation analysis fails to  reveal any  sort of con­
structional structure). A more  accurate analysis, revealing the structure 
of the  meaning of (S), can  b e  obtained b y  realising that  (S) claims that the 
individual  w h o  occupies the office of the richest m a n  (at some w o r l d /  
t ime couple) ha s  the proper ty  of being in  danger: 
XwXt [°Dangera,f °RM,„i]. 
Anyway,  such a n  analysis is not  fine-grained enough.  It does no t  en­
able u s  to per form all the adequate  inferences, e.g., to  deduce  that there 
is a m a n  w h o  is in  danger,  etc. W e  have  to  construct the  office R M  of the 
richest m a n  b y  composing "Richest a n d  "Man: 
XwXt [°RichesW "Man^i], 
a n d  w e  obtain  the analysis of the sentence (S), which is identical to the  
meaning  of (S): 
XzvXt ["Danger,^ [XzvXt [ORichesUr "Man, t i ]]J .  
T o  make  the construction easier to read,  w e  can  n o w  per fo rm a n  in­
nocent9 Л-conversion (ß-reduction): 
XioXt [°DangerIt,( [0RichestK,( °Man!U/]]. 
9
 ' Innocent '  because such a /.-conversion is a lways a n  equivalent transformation w e  just 
substi tute variables w, t for variables  w, t 
- 293 -
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/59873 21/1/2014
Marie Duží - Bj0rn Jespersen - Pavel Materna 
Note that the sentence does not say  anything about Bill Gates, and s o  
the analysis must  not and  does not contain a construction of Bill Gates. 
Without an additional premise that the richest m a n  at some W T  couple 
i s  Bill Gates w e  cannot logically derive f rom (S) that Bill Gates i s  in dan­
ger. Construction  [XwXt [ORichestaif °Мап
ш (
]] constructs the office RM / 
i
T Ü V  n o t  a i-object. However ,  the proper ty  of be ing  i n  dange r  cannot  b e  
ascribed t o  a n  office, b u t  to  a n  individual.  Hence  the  construction  [XwXt 
[°Richest!t,( °Мап
ш (
]] is subjected to the intensional descent with respect to 
w, t, and the office RM serves as a pointer to an unspecified individual 
that now is just contingently Bill Gates. 
Constructions can be used in two distinct suppositions. Using a me­
dieval terminology, w e  dist inguish the  de dieto a n d  de re supposit ion.  W e  
app ly  this terminology only to  analyses of empirical  sentences, t hough  
the  extension in to  analyt ical /mathematical  contexts w o u l d  b e  straight­
forward.  To  a d d u c e  a s imple example,  consider the  fol lowing sentences: 
(R) The president of the Czech Republic is a tennis player. 
(D) The president of the Czech Republic is eligible. 
Both the  sentences talk abou t  the  office of the  pres ident  of the Czech 
Republic (PCR); the  sentence (R) talks also abou t  the  p roper ty  (of be ing  
a) tennis  player,  the  sentence (D) about  the  p roper ty  (of being)  eligible. 
But, whereas  the proper ty  eligible i s  a p roper ty  of a n  office (that i ts  
holder ,  whoever  it m a y  be ,  m u s t  b e  elected), w e  cannot  ascribe the  p rop ­
erty of be ing  a tennis  player  to  a n  office, b u t  t o  a n  individual .  Hence,  
whereas  i n  (D) the  office PCR is  mentioned, i n  (R) this office i s  used to  
po in t  a t  a n  individual ,  the construction of the office PCR h a s  to  b e  sub­
jected to  the  intensional descent. Type-theoretical analysis a n d  synthesis 
reveal these facts: 
President  (of) / (i i)Ti0 - a n  empirical  funct ion 
C R  (Czech Republic) / i - for the  sake of simplicity, let CR b e  a n  in­
dividual  
TennisP(layer) / (oi)T[0 
Eligible / (о 1
Т
о))тш 
To construct the office PCR / i
T M
,  w e  have to compose "President and 
°CR: XwXt ["President^ °CR]. O u r  sentences a re  analysed a s  follows: 
(R') XwXt [°TennisPu,i [XwXt [°Presidentro( °CR]]tl,f] 
[XhjAí [°Presidenta;f °CR]] u s e d  de re 
(D') XwXt [°Eligiblea,f [XwXt [oPresidenW °CR]]] 
[XwXt [°Presidenta't °CR]] u s e d  de dieto 
- 294 -
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/59873 21/1/2014
Points of V iew from a Logical Perspective ( I )  
It may b e  the case that a construction that has been subjected to an in-
tensional descent is still de dieto, when occurring in a de dieto context, be­
cause the  de dieto context is dominant.  In  our  example the construction 
"President occurs de dieto in  (D') though it is composed wi th  w a n d  t, be­
cause it is a constituent of the  [kzukt ["Presidents °CR]] construction that 
is u s e d  wi th  the de dieto supposition in  (D'). This is d u e  to  the  fact that 
°President is n o t  composed with  the left-most occurrences of w, f; a -
renaming the variables reveals these facts: 
(R') \wkt ["TennisP^ [A.a>*A.ŕ* ["Presidents* °CR]]z„t] 
[Azt>*Áŕ* ["Presidenten* "CR]] used  de re 
(D') Axokt ["Eligible^ [kw*Xť ["President^* °CR]]] 
[A.zt>*Ar* ["Presidents* °CR]] used  de dieto 
W e  have  seen that speaking about  the  de dieto / de re supposition of 
a construction С is reasonable in case С is a constituent (i.e., a subcon-
struction that is used, not mentioned) of another construction С' of an in­
tension (most frequently a proposition). Hence С' is usually of a form 
XzuXt [...]. Calling the state-of-affairs constructed by the left-most zu, t pa­
i r  ' reporter 's  perspective',  w e  can  roughly characterise the  de re / de dieto 
distinction as  follows: 
A construction С of an intension Int occurs with the de re supposition 
in С' iff the intension Int is used as a pointer to its instance with the re­
por ter ' s  perspective, i.e., С is subjected to the intensional descent with 
respect to the left-most w, t; otherwise С occurs de dieto in С' . 1 0  
3. Analysing points of v i ew 
So far we have argued that the expression 'point of view' is homony­
mous .  Since it  expresses more  than one meaning, it denotes distinct ob­
jects of different types dependent ly  o n  the context in  which the expres­
sion is used. Therefore, w h e n  at tempting a t  a n  analysis, w e  have  to  take 
in to  account the context of (at least) the whole sentence. Moreover, the 
expression is rather  vague  a n d  it is  used  in  many  dissimilar contexts. 
Still, there is a common feature shared b y  all the possible denotations: It 
is, i n  general, a n  intensional  function, which dependent ly  o n  wor lds  
/ t i m e s  w h e n  being appl ied to a criterion, (i.e. a n  attribute, a property,  or  
whatever)  a n d  to a v iewed object (an individual, or  another  intension or 
10
 For more  information o n  the  de dieto / de re distinction see Duž í  (2004). 
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extension), results in a proposition or a set thereof. Expressions which 
may denote functions of particular distinct types that behave in the same 
w a y  are called polymorphic. In computer science polymorphic algorithms 
are frequently used without any problems, and programming languages 
based on the typed /.-calculus making polymorphic functions tractable 
are highly valued b y  programmers. Explicit typing and type-checking 
during the compilation process prevents writing programs that would 
fail during the run-time, and the programmer does not have  to write 
a special piece of program for each type of argument. 
A paradigmatic example is the function Cardinality or, more pre­
cisely, functions of particular types denoted b y  'cardinality'. These func­
tions are of type (x (oa)). A programmer simply writes a program that 
counts the number  of a-elements of a set, where  a is a type  variable (type 
parameter), the value of which is supplied dur ing  the run-time. 
When analysing natural  language expressions, w e  come across m a n y  
ambiguities, b u t  explicit typing is a significant semantic feature that can­
no t  b e  neglected. Yet i n  some cases the  need  for typing can  become a res­
trictive factor. For instance, a n  analysis of the simple question—What is 
Charles thinking about?—is impossible even within the ramified type sys­
tem, because Charles can  b e  thinking of a n  object of any type, even of the 
type, the type of a type, etc. A n  analogy with  the programming language 
is no t  helpful  here, for  there are n o  such things as  the compilation-time 
or run-time of a n  analysis. W e  cannot introduce ' type  variables' or  con­
structions constructing types, for types are s imply 'pre-concepts' of the 
TIL system. A possible solution within a 'super-ramified'  theory of types 
has  been  outlined in  Duž í  (1993), but  this is  out of the scope of the pre­
sent  study. 
Still w e  k n o w  the schematic type of the object denoted b y  a particular 
polymorphic expression ' think'.  The type-theoretical analysis terminates 
in  a relation-in-intension between a n  individual  a n d  a n  arbitrary a -
object: Think / (o i a)TC0. Using this polymorphic expression in  a sentence 
usually disambiguates  a. (But not  always: the sentence  Charles is thinking 
of the richest man is  inherently ambiguous; Charles can b e  thinking of the  
individual w h o  occupies the  office of the richest man ,  Thinki / (o i i)TC1, 
or  of the office itself—Thin кг / (o i 1
T ( U
)
T ( I V
 or even of the concept of the 
richest man—ТЫпкз / (o i *i)
T ( 0
.) 
The term 'point of view' is also vague and type-polymorphic. In gen­
eral, as  w e  already said, there is always a viewed object a n d  a criterion 
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with respect to which the object is evaluated and thereby characterised 
and classified. Thus w e  can propose a schematic type for the object de­
noted: 
'Point of view' denotes a function  V, which—when applied to 
a 'viewing criterion' in the broadest sense, i.e., an individual, office, 
property, or even a scientific theory, and to the v iewed object (again in 
the broadest sense) —returns  a proposition: V / (о
т ш
 ß a )  or  V / (о
т а
 ß a)T(0, 
where  ß is the type of the 'viewing criterion', a the  type of the object that  
is viewed (by a n  agent, w h o  is no t  typed individually). 
In wha t  follows w e  classify particular types of points  of view wi th  re­
spect to the type a of the viewed object. The list is  not ,  a n d  actually can­
no t  be, exhaustive (due to  the infinite hierarchy of the objects of our  on­
tology). 
3.1 The v iewed object i s  an  individual 
The simplest w a y  of characterising a n  individual is b y  using its  attributes. 
Example: 
(SI) From the point of view of age, Charles is an old man, but from the 
point of view of his activities, Charles is a vital, youthful man. 
First, w e  h a v e  to  explicate the te rm 'attribute of a n  individual '  (for 
details see D u ž í  (2001)). In a common use this term denotes a property 
of individuals, b u t  in the last two decades—due to the development of 
database conceptual theories—the term 'attribute' has been used in 
a broader sense, denoting an (empirical) function of any type. Thus, for 
instance, the age  of ..., the salary of ... are attributes of the type (x i)Tm/ the 
address of ... i s  of type  (a i)TCl) (where members of a are tuples (state, 
town, street + number, ZIP code)), parents of...  / ((1,1) i)Tt0, etc11. That at­
tributes are intensions is obvious: The address  of a person can change 
over time (temporal parameter т), and it is not logically necessary that 
the person lives at the given address A; he/she could have lived any­
where  else (modal  parameter  a>). 
A n  analysis of (SI): 
1. Type-theoretical analysis. 
11
 In Conceptual Modell ing w e  often need to model  attributes that re turn  a n  object that is 
a tuple, which consists of other  simpler objects Hence w e  u s e  a n  adjusted definition of 
types a n d  constructions—enriched with tuple types or sequences, and constructions of 
tuples and projections. See, e g., Muller (2006, 2006a) 
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Charles —> Ch / i 





t m  
age of -> Age / (т i )
O T  
old man —» 01d A s e  / (oi)TÜ) 







T 0 )  
activities of —> Act / ((o(oi)T0>) i)TO 
(for the sake of simplicity, activities assigned to an individual 
are analysed as  sets of properties) 
vital, youthful man —»YoungA c t / (oi)TO) 
2.  Synthesis. 
( S ľ )  XwXt [(["View^i °Age °Ch] = XwXt [°01dAs*
 wt °Ch]) л 
([°View2i„( °Act °Ch] = XwXt [°YoungAct
 wt °Ch])] 




)  is a relation between propositions (iden­
tity of propositions). 
Remarks: 
a) Note  that  the  sentence (SI) does  n o t  talk about  the  way in  which the 
obtained characteristics (i.e., that Charles is a n  old man ,  etc.) have  
been  arrived at. In particular, (SI) does  no t  specify which values of 
Charles '  attributes were taken into account, and  wha t  these values 
are. E.g., Charles m a y  b e  a n  80-year old active musician, b u t  there is 
n o  trace of this fact in (SI). O u r  analysis ( S ľ )  respects the principle of 
subject mattern: Particular constituents °Age, "Act, as  well as  0OldAse  
a n d  °YoungAct are  used  de dieto, i.e., their values d o  no t  matter. 
b) Some apparent  paradoxes are often explained away  b y  referring to  
points  of view: Don' t  w e  often say something like "Charles is bo th  
old a n d  young"  tacitly meaning just (SI), namely "Age-viewing 
Charles—he is  an old man, whereas activity-viewing Charles—he is  
a y o u n g  man"? W e  think so. 
Our analysis ( S ľ )  blocks undesirable, f lawed arguments like: 
From the point of v iew of age, Charles is  an old man, s o  Charles is  
an old man. 
From the point of v iew of activities, Charles is a young man, s o  
Charles is  a young man. Therefore, Charles is old and young. 
1 2
 For details see Materna, P - Duží, M (2005). 
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A schema of such a flawed argument is as  follows. Let Criterion b e  a con­
struction of the viewing criterion, Object a construction of a viewed ob­
ject, Property a construction of a property ascribed to the object: 
[°= ["Viewjrf Criterion Object] [XwiXh [PropertyWltl Object]]] 
[Propertywt Object] 




 Object]] occurs de dieto in the prem­
ise, i.e., the constructed proposition is just mentioned, which does not  
justify the  t ru th  (in a given  w, t) of the value  ^ -constructed b y  [Proper-
tywi Object] in  the conclusion. Properties ascribed to  a viewed object 
relative t o  a particular viewpoint cannot  b e  ascribed to the object 'ab­
solutely'. 
Viewing a n  individual  m a y  b e  performed also b y  a n  explicit agent. Con­
sider the sentence 
(52) Marie likes this flower from the viewpoint of its colour. 
1. Ti/ре-theoretical analysis. 







T ( 0  
colour (of an individual) -> Colour / ((oi)
T < u
 i )
T ( 0  
like —» Like / (ou) t t0  
Marie, this flower —> Mary / i, This-Flower / i 1 3  
2. Synthesis. 
(S2') XwXt [[Wiewmř "Colour °This-Flower] = 
= Xwkt [0Likei„( °Marie °This-Flower]] 
Remark: Again,  the sentence (S2) does  n o t  talk about  the  way in  which 
Marie likes the flower. Marie m a y  like p ink  colour a n d  the flower m a y  
b e  pink,  b u t  o u r  analysis (S2') respects the  principle of subject matter: The 
particular constituents °Colour, °Like a re  used  de dieto. 
3.2 The v iewed object is an intension (property or office) 
Consider the  following sentences: 
(53) Spiders have 8 limbs. 
(54) Whales are mammals. 
13
 Indexicals fall outs ide of the  scope of this paper;  this flower is simply treated as  denot ing 
a n  individual  here. 
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(55) Birds can fly (unless they are penguins or ostriches or .. .)• 
(56) Swans are white (unless they are b o r n  i n  N e w  Zealand or Aus­
tralia or  ...). 
(57) God is omniscient. 
(58) The King of France is a ruler of France. 
It might  seem that these sentences characterise individuals, b u t  it is 
no t  so. Having 8 limbs, being a mammal, having the ability to fly, being white, 
being omniscient are properties of individuals. However,  these sentences 
characterise particular  properties (or offices—S7, S8) b y  specifying some 
other properties which their instances (bearers) necessarily (S3, S4, S7, 
S8) o r  typically (S5, S6) have. 
W e  need  to define t w o  important  notions: a requisite (Req) of a property 
(an office) a n d  a characteristic, typical property (TP) assigned to a property (an 
office). Let p, q b e  variables of l s l  order,  ranging over properties (оа)
тш/
 c a 
variable ranging over offices а
т ш /
 x a variable ranging over a. We define: 
ReqPr =df Xpq VwVt Vx [[q
wt
 x] э [p
wt
 x]] (p is a requisite of q) 
Req o f  =dt Xpc VwVt [[°Е
Ю
, с] z> Vx [{c
wt










]] (p is a requisite of the office c) 
ТРР
Г
 =DF Xpqe VwVt VX X] Э [[q
wt
 x] Z> \p
wt
 X]]] 
(p is typical of q, unless e) 
TP o f  =df Xpce \fw\/t [[°Ea,( c] ID Vx [-^[ewt -t] ~d [[cwt = x] гз [pwt x]]]] 
or equivalently: 
Xpce \/wVt [[°Ea>ŕ c] Z) [-i[e
wt cwt] z> [pwt c,rf]] 
(p i s  typical of the office  c, unless  e) 




 is the property of existence, e ranges over some 'excep­
tions', ' the  unless properties'/ (оа)
1Ш
, the so-called guards of the rule in Ar­
tificial Intelligence. The property  E is in wan t  of explanation. In  his  
(1979) Tichý makes a strong case for the claim that existence is  not a pro­
per ty  of individuals, b u t  a proper ty  of intensions, namely the property  of 
being instantiated, o r  occupied, i n  a wor ld / t ime .  Claiming, e.g., that the 
President of the Czech Republic does  no t  exist, w e  d o  no t  w a n t  to  say 
that  a particular individual does n o t  exist (which 'non-existing' one  wo­
u l d  it  be?), b u t  w e  simply make  a claim about the state-of-affairs in  
which the office of the president of Czech Republic is n o t  occupied. 
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Now more precise w a y  formulating statements S3 - S7 can be  either 
in terms of requisites (e.g., that having eight limbs is  a requisite of the 
property of being a spider), or using the necessary status of ascribing the 
implied property—requisite to a n  object o n  the assumption that the ob­
ject has  the antecedent proper ty  assigned (for instance, that necessarily 
all spiders have  eight limbs). 
The respective analyses a re  (denoted properties: S(pider), 8L-having 
8 limbs, W(hale), M(ammal),  B(ird), F(ly), P(enguin o r  ostrich), Sw(an), 
W(hite), ZA-born  in  N e w  Zealand o r  Australia, RF-being a ruler of 
France, Omni(scisent), all of them of type (oi)T0J, a n d  God, K(ing of) 
F(rance) of type iTW): 
(S3') [°Req °8L °S] or  VwVt Vx [[°S
ro
ŕ x] D [08L
r
„ř x]] 
(Necessarily, all spiders have eight limbs) 
(S4') [°Req °M °W] o r  VwVt Vx x] D [°Ма,
(
 x]] 
(Necessarily, all whales are mammals) 
(S5') [«TP «F «В op] or VwVf Vx [[-.op^]
 3
 [ [о
В ю (  x ]
 ^ 
(Necessarily, if something is not a penguin or an ostrich, then if 
it is a bird then it flies) 
(S6') [°TP °W °Sw °ZA] or  VZÜV t Vx [[-PZAwt x] n [[°Swro( x]  ID [ ° W w t  x]]] 
(Necessarily, if something is not born in N e w  Zealand or Aus ­
tralia, then if it is s w a n  then it is white) 





VwVt [[°ETO( °God] ZD [°Omnirof oGod^,]] 
(Necessarily, if God  exists then H e  is omniscient) 
(S8') [OReq °RF °KF], o r  VwVŕ [[0Е
Ш(
 °KF] э Vx [[OKF*,, = X]ZD [ORF,«, x]]] 
o r  
VwVi [[°EIBf °KF] ľD [0RF;„( °KF„,]] 
(Necessarily, if the King of France exists then h e  is a ruler of 
France) 
N o w  w e  can  again app ly  particular points of v iew with respect to  
some criteria. W e  can, for  instance, analyse 
(S9) From the point of vieiv of the number of limbs, spiders are eight-
limbed. 
(510) From the point of view of the ability to move, birds can usually fly. 
(511) From an epistemic point of view, God is perfect. 
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Type analysis: 
number of limbs —» N L  / (x i)TM 
point of view S9 - »  View9 / (о
тш
 (x i )
r a
 (oi)
T Í 0 ) T m  
mobile ability of —» M A  / ((ог)
1Ш
 i )
T ( u  
poínŕ o/ui'eiü S20 -> View10 / (oTm((oi)T„ v)TM(oi)ra)TC„ 













T ( 1 )  
(S9') XwAŕ [[°View9;„( °NL °S] = XwXt Vx [[0S,„f x] з [°8U„ x]]] 
(SIO') XwXt [[°View10it,ř °MA °B] = XwXt M x x] ZD [°Fa„ .v]]] 
( S l ľ )  XwXt [[oView1 1^ °bCnow °God] = XwXt [[°E
ít,f °God] z) 
D [°Omni
w( °Goda,í]]] 
A n d  so on. 
The well-known example of a paradoxical sentence claiming that 
Richard Nixon is both a pacifist and militant can now b e  solved as  fol­
lows. The claims 
(S12) Being a Quaker,  Nixon is a pacifist; being a Republican, h e  is 
militant 
can b e  unders tood in  two  different ways: 
a) Under  the aspect of being a Quaker,  Nixon is a pacifist; u n d e r  the 
aspect of being a Republican, h e  is militant. 
b )  Since a typical property  of being a Quaker  is being a pacifist a n d  
Nixon is a Quaker,  h e  might be a pacifist; since a typical property 
of being a Republican is be ing  militant a n d  Nixon is a Republican, 
h e  might be militant. 
The reading a d  a) does  no t  lead to  paradox as  w e  have  shown  in  Sec­
tion 3.1. Nixon is simply neither a n  'absolute '  pacifist nor  a n  'absolute'  
militant. Only  f rom particular viewpoints  m a y  h e  appear  to b e  a 'partial '  
pacifist a n d  a 'partial '  militant. 
The reading a d  b) makes  use  of typical properties, making the claim 
rather vague. A n  obvious w a y  to avoid paradox consists in  considering 
Nixon as  the exception of bo th  (or just one  of the) rules: as  a result h e  is 
neither a pacifist n o r  militant, or  h e  is either no t  a pacifist o r  no t  militant. 
Note  that  u p  to  n o w  the use  of points  of view has  no t  led to a total, 
exhaustive characteristic of the v iewed object. W e  usually provide  just 
some  partial characteristics even if w e  characterise a property  o r  a n  office 
b y  means  of some of its requisites, which its instances mus t  have  neces­
sarily. To  obtain  total characterisations, w e  w o u l d  have  to u se  all the req­
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uisites of an intension. The collection of all the requisites of an intension 
q is called the essence of the intension q, Ess / ((o (oa)T[0) (oa)TW)): 
°Ess =df Xq X.p [°Req p q]. 
A n  essence is a function which w h e n  applied to  a property  q returns the 
set of all the requisites of q. (Analogously for  a n  office c.) 
The proper ty  q is then  defined b y  its requisites i n  the following man­
ner: 
q =df XwXt Xx (\fp [[°Ess q] p] z> [pwt x]) 
q is the proper ty  of a-objects of having  all the properties that belong to 
the essence of q. In other words,  a n  a-object x ha s  the  property  q if a n d  
only if it h a s  all the properties belonging t o  the essence of q: 
Iqwtx] = [Vp [[°Ess q] p] D [pwt x]]. 
If the n u m b e r  of requisites  pl,...,p" belonging to  the set [°Ess q]  is fi­
nite, w e  can  exhaustively  define the intension  q in the following manner:  
q =df XwXt Xx [[рг
Ш
1 x] л [p2
wt
 x] л ... л \p"
wt
 x]]. 
The question whether using (general) points of view belonging to 
a particular theory (e.g., biology, logic, physics, ...) might lead to equiva­
lent definitions (total characterisations) of the viewed intension a n d  the 
problem of definitions in  general will b e  handled  i n  details in  Chapter  5 
of Par t  II of this s tudy.  
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